This paper presents a formalization of refraining from actions and a deontic logic based on a process logic. The notion of refraining is needed to handle obligated actions. To refrain to do an action is to do something else. The process logic used is a mix of dynamic logic and temporal logic: actions in it are interpreted as sets of paths and temporal formulas describe the process of performing actions. The deontic logic has a temporal propositional constant saying that a bad thing will be done in the next moment. Normative properties of actions can be defined according to what happens in the process of performing actions.
the first problem with [13] . However, the focus is on permission only, and there is no attempt to deal with refraining from an action or with obligation. Pucella and Weissman [16] extend the logic in [19] by introducing two dynamic operators: one adds and another removes permitted transitions. The two operators are used to model the dynamics of the so-called policies, which concern what is and what is not permitted.
Realizing that the formalization of refraining from an action in [13] is problematic, [2] and [17] present alternative proposals, both based on a relational semantics for actions. The motivation of [2] is that the formalization in [13] cannot be easily generalized to encompass iteration and converse of actions. Broersen [2] views α as a constrained complement of α: α is not the complement of α w.r.t. the universal relation but the complement of α w.r.t. the set consisting of all the transitions resulting from performing actions constructed without use of the operator . Under this treatment, the intersection of the interpretations of α and α is always empty; however, the problem with the intersection of the interpretations of α and α; β remains: the intersection might not be empty. The motivation of [17] concerns a puzzle about the normative sentences 'you are permitted either to eat the dessert or not' and 'you are permitted either to kiss me or not'. In the free-choice permission reading, the latter implies that the addressee may kiss the speaker but the former does not. However, the two factual sentences embedded in the two normative sentences, 'you eat the dessert or not' and 'you kiss me or not', are tautologies and equivalent.
To remedy this, [17] interprets α in a so-called stratified way. Firstly, for every atomic action a with the interpretation R a , it defines R a , the interpretation of a, in the following way: a transition (w, u) is in R a iff (w, u) is not in R a but (w, x) is in R a for some x; then by four inductive rules taken from [22] , it defines the interpretation of α for every compound action α. However, this approach suffers from the same problem as [13] : neither the intersection of α and α; β nor the intersection of α and α is always empty.
We try to take one further step along this dynamic direction of deontic logic. We do two things. A new formalization for refraining from actions is proposed. We think that this formalization has intuitive support. A new deontic logic based on a variant of the process logic from [14] is presented. This process logic is a natural mix of PDL and Full Computation Tree Logic (CTL * ), introduced in [3] , and can be used to talk about what happens during the performance of actions. By use of a temporal propositional constant saying that a bad behaviour will be made, this process logic can express more normative properties of actions than previous works. This paper mainly consists of two parts: Sections 2, 3 and 4 focus on refraining from an action, Sections 5, 6 and 7 on the deontic logic.
As Peter Thomas Geach discusses in his classic paper [6] , many of the so-called paradoxes of deontic logic were caused by a shift from viewing obligatory and permitted as qualifications of actions to viewing them as qualifications of result states of actions. The present paper is in the tradition where this aberration is corrected, and as a result many of the paradoxes that were mentioned by Geach have disappeared. Geach calls the step from qualifying actions to qualifying states a 'fatal false step', and we agree.
Our framework deals with composite actions, so we can say things like after doing α, the agent is obliged to do β. It does not matter whether α is good or bad. In case α is bad, talking about what is obliged after it gets performed is talking about contrary to duty obligation. For if α is bad, the agent has an obligation to avoid α. Still, if the agent, contrary to duty, performs α, we end up in a new situation where new obligations may hold. So this is a kind of conditional obligation. Still, in our framework alternative states of affairs are only accessible through action, so we cannot say things like the world is φ, but if the world would be ¬φ (different from how it actually is), then the agent would be obliged to do α. So in this sense, our framework does not handle conditional obligation.
Models
Let 0 be a finite set of atomic actions and a range over 0 . Define the set PDL of actions as follows:
indicates the impossible action. Doing id means doing nothing. 0 and id are also called atomic actions in the sequel. Define 1 as the action 0 ∪ 0 ∪ id; doing it means doing an atomic action. Let 0 be a countable set of atomic propositions.
. V is a function from 0 to 2 W .
Atomic actions are pairwise disjoint; this special constraint guarantees that syntactically different atomic actions are semantically different. Later we will see that this constraint serves for the formalization of refraining from something. R id is the identity relation. So the action id just leaves states as they are. R is serial, as R id is. At every state, there is always something to do. B is the set of bad transitions and R − B the set of fine transitions. The extra constraint on B is called normative seriality; it indicates that there is no state at which no fine transition can be made. The models defined here are the same as the models for PDL and CTL * if we ignore bad transitions. 1 Behind models, we presuppose that there are a group of people and an agent. The agent doing an action at a state might cause a transition to another state. Some transitions are bad and others fine for the group as a whole.
It is common in process logics that atomic actions are interpreted as arbitrary sets of sequences of states. Here we treat atomic actions as binary relations. The difference between the two ways is as follows. Interpreting atomic actions as binary relations indicates that reasoning is happening at the lowest level. Interpreting atomic actions as sets of state sequences indicates that reasoning is happening at a higher level and atomic actions are actually action schemas. However, as [21] argues, even if atomic actions are viewed as schemas, they are still not arbitrary.
Note that to consider an action as atomic is not to deny that the action may have internal structure; it simply means that this internal structure is supposed to be irrelevant. When we consider a traffic accident to be an atomic action, this does not mean that it does not have internal structure, it just means that the precise details of just how we wrecked our car do not matter.
Fix 
Each action α is interpreted as a set S α of paths in the following way:
A path in the interpretation of an action means that performing this action can cause the series of transitions represented by this path. This semantics for actions has the following feature: for every atomic actions a 1 , . . . , a n , all the paths in S a 1 ;...;a n contain n + 1 states if S a 1 ;...;a n is not empty.
Actions are interpreted as sets of paths; this makes it possible to talk about the process of performing actions. By resorting to whether a bad transition is made in the process of performing an action, we can define some normative properties of this action. This is what we do. But before getting there, let us first deal with the notion of refraining from an action, because we think that obligation is dependent on this notion.
Refraining from actions
We think that at every situation, all that the agent is able to do is just basic actions. To refrain from an action is not an independent action; it is just an economical expression of to do something else. A similar idea is also held by [2] . We think that to do something else meets the principle of symmetry: if doing α is doing something else than β, then doing β is also doing something else than α. It is reasonable to impose the principle of perfect tense: deeds that are done remain done forever. In other words, for every action, if the agent has done it, then he will always have done it. Under the two principles, we do not have many choices in analysing to do something else.
Let's look at an example. Let a and b be two different actions. Fix a start point. When would we say that the agent has done something else than a;b? Clearly, if the agent has done a, he has done something else than b. By the principle of the perfect tense, if he has done a;b, he has done something else than b. By the symmetry principle, if he has done b, he has done something else than a;b. We cannot say that if the agent has done a, he has done something else than a;b. Why? Assume so. Then by the principle of perfect tense, if he has done a;b, he has done something else than a;b, which is strange. We must therefore conclude that doing b is doing something else than a;b, but doing a is not doing something else than a;b. In what follows, for every α in PDL , we specify a β in PDL which means to do something else than α in the above sense.
Each finite sequence of atomic actions is called a computation sequence, abbreviated as a seq. Seqs are just strings of symbols. For example, aabb is a seq. The empty seq is denoted by and the set of seqs denoted by * 0 . Each nonempty seq corresponds to an action in a natural way. For example, aabb corresponds to a;a;b;b. For all sets and of seqs, let ; = γ δ | γ ∈ & δ ∈ . CS(α), the set of the seqs of α, is defined as follows:
Each seq of α represents a way to perform α. α is called an empty action if CS(α) = ∅. In the sequel, for every seq σ and set of seqs, we use σ to denote {σ τ | τ ∈ }. For every model, define S , the interpretation of in this model, as the whole universe. It can be shown that
Atomic actions are interpreted as pairwise disjoint binary relations and compound actions are interpreted as sets of paths. As a result, the following proposition holds:
Then there is a seq a 1 . . . a n in CS(α) and a seq b 1 
This is a crucial fact for this work. Let denote the relation of initial segment and the converse of it, called extension. In the sequel, we use this relation in the contexts of seqs and also state sequences. Let σ and τ be two seqs.
cab is also x-different from ab, as ab cab and cab ab, although ab is a segment of cab.
Here are some basic facts about x-difference. As is an initial segment of every seq, no seq is
there is no way to extend σ s.t. the extension of σ is identical to τ , and there is also no way to extend τ s.t. the extension of τ is identical to σ.
For all actions α and β, we say that α is x-different from β, α ≈ β, if for all seqs σ ∈ CS(α) and τ ∈ CS (β), σ ≈ τ . The relation of x-difference for actions formalizes the word 'else' in the imperatives such as 'don't watch cartoons anymore and do something else'. β is something else but α if β is x-different from α.
Given an action α, there might be many actions each of which is something else than α. For example, both b and c are something else for a. This means that the relation of x-difference itself is not enough to handle the notion of to do something else, as the latter also involves a quantifier over actions. Luckily, for every α, among the actions which all are something else, there is a greatest one in the sense that the set of its seqs contains all the seqs of the others. This lets us deal with the notion of to do something else without introducing any quantifier.
DEFINITION 3.2 (The function of opposite)
Let be a set of seqs. , the opposite of , is defined as {τ | τ ≈ σ for every σ ∈ }.
is always closed under extension; this is an important feature of it. Opposite is different from complement:
is always a subset of but not vice versa. Here is a counter-example: let = {ab}; then a ∈ but a / ∈ . Opposite has certain connection with complement. Define T as the set of the seqs which is x-equal to some seq in . T is called the tree generated from . It can be seen that = T .
There is a different way to look at T . Let be the smallest set which contains and is closed under extension, and the smallest set which contains and is closed under initial segments. It can be verified that = T . This result will be used later. Note that T might not be closed under extension.
The following proposition specifies some important properties of the function of opposite:
PROOF. 1 . Assume that there is a seq τ in ∩ . Then τ ≈ σ for any σ ∈ . Then τ ≈ τ . We have a contradiction. 2 . By the sixth item of this proposition, ⊆ ; . As ; ⊆ ; , ⊆ ; . Then
. This is impossible. Then λ ∈ . Then κλ ∈ ; , i.e. σ ∈ ; . 6 . Let σ ∈ . Then σ ≈ τ for every τ ∈ . Let τ ∈ ; . Then there is a τ ∈ s.t. τ τ .
As ≈ is closed under extension, σ ≈ τ . Then σ ∈ ; . The converse of the fourth item does not hold. As for every , is closed under extension, we can get that for every , if is not closed under extension, then ⊆ . Here is an example: let 0 = a, b and = aa, ab ; then = b * 0 and = a * 0 ; then aaa ∈ but aaa / ∈ . To simplify our statements, we do not consider the atomic actions id and 0 in this example. We will do this again in some examples in the sequel. The converse of the fifth item does not hold either and the reason is that ; ⊆ ; might not hold. What follows is a counter-example: let 0 = {a, b}, = {aa, a} and = {ab}; then = b * 0 ∪ aa * 0 ; then aab ∈ ; ; as aab ∈ ; , aab / ∈ ; . The fifth item has a condition, i.e. = ∅. This item does not hold without this condition. For a counter-example, let 0 = a, b and = ab . Then ; = * 0 , as ; = ∅. We see that a / ∈ and a / ∈ ; . PROPOSITION 3.4 For every α ∈ PDL , there is a β ∈ PDL s.t
. CS(β) = CS(α).
PROOF. As shown in the literature of automata theory, a set of seqs is a so-called regular language if and only if there is an α ∈ PDL s.t. CS(α) = . 3 Therefore, it suffices to show that CS(α) is a regular language. As mentioned in Section 3, CS(α) = CS(α) T where CS(α) T is the tree generated from CS(α). Then it suffices to show that CS(α) T is a regular language. Let be the smallest set which contains CS(α) and is closed under extension. It can be seen that CS(α; (a 1 ∪ · · · ∪ a n ) * ) = where 0 = {a 1 , . . . , a n }. Then is a regular language. Let be the smallest set containing which is closed under initial segments. By [9] , the closure of a regular language under initial segments is also a regular language. Then is a regular language. equals to CS(α) T . Then CS(α) T is a regular language. By [9] , the complement of a regular language is also a regular language. Then CS(α) T is a regular language.
This β is called the opposite of α, denoted by α. Here is an example: let 0 = a, b, c ; then
Hence, α is the union of all the actions which are something else but α. To refrain to do α is to do something else; to do anything else is to do α.
As mentioned before, it is reasonable to require that anything else but α has empty intersections with α; β and with α. The following proposition states that this is indeed the case:
This result can be proved by use of Propositions 3.1 and 3. 3 . In standard relational semantics, an action α is just interpreted as a binary relation R α instead of a set of paths. Then neither R α ∩ R α = ∅ nor R α ∩ R α;β = ∅ is the case even if atomic actions are pairwise disjoint. Here is a counter-example for both. Let a, b and c be three atomic actions. Let w 3 ) and R c = (w 1 , w 3 ) . We see that the three atomic actions are
In reality, we always view doing nothing as a way to refrain from something. This is what we introduce the special action id for.
Atomic actions in process logics are usually interpreted as arbitrary sets of state sequences. One may wonder whether the above formalization of refraining still works if so. Actually, there is no problem if we put as a constraint the generalized pairwise disjointness on atomic actions. Previously we specify a relation x-different: two sets S and T of seqs are x-different if there is no σ ∈ S and τ ∈ T s.t. one is an initial segment of another. Define it among sets of state sequences in a similar way. Let α be defined as above. It can be verified that Proposition 3.5 always holds once atomic actions are x-different from each other.
An interesting thing can happen to the notion of refraining when infinity is involved. We look at a special action a * ; b. To perform it is to perform a for finitely many times and then perform b once. It can be verified that a * ; b is an empty action. It can be seen that the infinite seq aaa . . . does not take any seq of a * ; b as an initial segment. This means that if the agent keeps doing a forever, there will never be a moment when we can say that he has done a * ; b and a moment when we can say that he has done something else.
Concise actions
There is a special class of actions that we want to identify in the context of refraining. For an action α, there might be another action β s.t. refraining from α is the same as refraining from β. So the obligation to do α would be equivalent to the obligation to do β. In the last section, for a set X of seqs, we use X T , called the tree generated from X , to denote τ | τ ≈ σ for some σ ∈ X . Let and be two sets of seqs. We say that and are y-equivalent if T = T . 4 For example, if 0 = a, b , = a and = aa, ab , then and are y-equivalent. Note = T . For every α and β, if CS(α) and CS (β) are y-equivalent, then refraining from α is the same as refraining from β. Here are two basic facts about trees, which will be used later:
2. If T = T , then for every σ ∈ , there is a τ ∈ s.t. σ ≈ τ , and for every τ ∈ , there is a σ ∈ s.t. σ ≈ τ .
Note that for all seqs σ and τ , if τ σ , then
DEFINITION 4.2 (Concise actions) A set of seqs is concise if for no σ ∈ there is a σ σ s.t. σ T ⊆ T . An action α is concise if CS(α) is concise.
For example, {a} is concise but {aa, ab} is not, as a aa and {a} T = aa, ab T = a a, b * .
The notion of conciseness can be understood in the following way. Assume that contains a seq σ s.t. there is a σ σ s.t. σ T ⊆ T . By replacing σ by σ in , we get . By Proposition 4.1,
is simpler than in the sense that σ is shorter than σ .
PROPOSITION 4.3
For every set of seqs, there is a unique set of seqs which is concise and y-equivalent to .
PROOF. Define a set of seqs as follows: for every σ , σ ∈ iff (i) σ σ for some σ ∈ , (ii) {σ } T ⊆ T and (iii) there is no σ σ s. 
. Then τ ∈ T . This implies T ⊆ T . Thirdly, we show the uniqueness of . Let X be a concise set of seqs s.t. X T = T . We want to show X = . As T = T , X T = T . Let σ ∈ . By the second item of Proposition 4.1, there is a τ ∈ X s.t.
is not concise and we get a contradiction. Then σ τ . In a similar way, we can get τ σ . Then σ = τ . Then σ ∈ X . This implies ⊆ X . Similarly, we know X ⊆ . As
We get a contradiction. Then σ ∈ min .
. Then δ ∈ T . Then δ ≈ θ for some θ ∈ . This is impossible, as δ ∈ . 
Deontic logic based on a process logic
PDL handles the input/output behaviour of terminating actions well and CTL * is useful for reasoning about progressive behaviour of nonterminating actions. Nishimura [14] proposes a process logic which is a natural mix of PDL and CTL * and can deal with the progressive behaviour of terminating actions. We present a deontic logic based on a variant of this process logic.
Syntax
Recall that PDL is a set of actions and 0 a countable set of atomic propositions. Let α range over PDL and p over 0 . Define a set TDDL of formulas as follows:
The reading of the featured formulas is as follows:
1. b: something bad will be done in the next moment. 2. Xφ: φ will be the case in the next moment. 3 . φUψ : φ will be the case until ψ. 4 . α φ: no matter how the agent will perform α, φ is the case now.
X and U are temporal operators and Xφ and φUψ are temporal formulas. b is a temporal propositional constant. p and α φ are state formulas. Later we will see that temporal formulas are essentially evaluated at states relative to paths and state formulas are evaluated at states not relative to any specific paths.
It seems weird to say that no matter how the agent will perform α, φ is the case now. In fact, this is fine, as whether a temporal sentence is true or not now might be dependent on how the agent will act in the future. For example, whether a student will pass an exam is dependent on how he will study. In order to make a temporal sentence true now, the agent has to act in some way in the future.
The other routine propositional connectives and the falsity ⊥ are defined in the usual way. Here are some special derivative expressions:
b is a genuine temporal formula. A formula φ is valid if for every model M and path w 0 . . . w n , M, w 0 . . . w n φ. We use TDDL to denote the set of valid formulas.
We put aside the propositional constant b temporarily. The logic TDDL is a merge of PDL and CTL * : the path quantifier A of CTL * is replaced by α which refers to the action α, and temporal formulas talk about what happens during the execution of α, instead of nonterminating computations. TDDL is a minimal merge of PDL and CTL * in this sense: its models are just the models of PDL and CTL * ; its dynamic factor is just the path modality α and its temporal factor is just the temporal operators X and U. The main difference between TDDL and the process logic in [14] lies in that the latter interprets atomic actions as arbitrary sets of sequences. For a comparison between the process logic in [14] and other process logics, we refer to [7] .
Normative properties of actions
TDDL is able to describe what happens during the performance of actions. The propositional constant b says that a bad behaviour will be made. This makes it possible that TDDL can define some normative properties of actions according to whether something bad happens and how it happens during their performance.
The temporal formula Gf intuitively means that at every point in the future, if it is not the end, something fine will be done in the next moment. F X ∧ f indicates that at some point in the future something fine will be done in the next moment. Note that Ff is always true but F X ∧ f is not; so they are different. By combining α , α , Gf and F(X ∧ f), we can have four notions of permission:
By negating a permission we get a prohibition. A prohibition of refraining expresses an obligation. We can get four notions of prohibition and obligation:
where X ∈{A, B, C, D}. Fix a model. We say that a path w 0 . . . w n is legal if it contains no bad transition, and evil if it contains no fine transition. Trivially, w is both legal and evil path. It can be seen that w 0 . . . w n is legal iff Gf is true at it, and evil iff G X → b is true at it. The truth conditions of the four groups of normative formulas can be stated by use of legal and evil paths:
A α ⇔ some path in S α starting at w 0 is legal. F X α is just the negation of P X α and its semantics is simply omitted. All the normative formulas are state formulas. Figure 1 illustrates the difference among the four notions of permission. P A α is the lack-of-prohibition permission and P B α the free-choice permission. As far as we know, neither P C α nor P D α corresponds to a notion of permission in reality. The following valid formulas tell some basic properties of the normative notions.
Recall that 1 is the union of all atomic actions. The first formula indicates that there is always something allowed to do. The second formula means that if α is doable, then the obligation to do it implies the permission to do it.
Here are some features of the four notions of permission which involve action constructors:
The third formula shows that P B has the feature of free-choice permission. What follows are some valid formulas concerning obligation:
Note that none of the converses of the implications hold.
In Section 1 we mention a few inferences which are useful to test whether a deontic logic in the dynamic approach considers intermediate states of performing actions. 1 . Killing is prohibited; therefore, killing and then surrendering are also prohibited. 2 . Smoking and then leaving are permitted; therefore, smoking is permitted. 3. Rescuing the injured and then calling an ambulance are obligatory; therefore, rescuing the injured is obligatory.
These inferences are valid w.r.t. the first group of normative notions. Note that the prohibition of killing does not imply the prohibition of surrendering after killing. Indeed, it can be verified that F A k ∧ k P A s is satisfiable where k and s represent killing and surrendering, respectively. Here is some comparison between TDDL and the deontic logic proposed by [19] , which is called Dynamic Logic of Permission (DLP). DLP interprets atomic actions as arbitrary sets of state sequences. TDDL is different from DLP at this point. DLP makes a distinction between fine and bad transitions. TDDL also does this. TDDL has temporal operators and can directly describe the process of performing actions. Deontic operators are defined in TDDL. DLP does not have any temporal operator. Instead, it has two primitive deontic operators ♦ and π which are for lack-of-prohibition and free-choice permission, respectively. Generally speaking, we think that TDDL is more flexible than DLP in dealing with normative properties of actions.
As mentioned previously, [19] focuses on permission only and does not handle refraining from actions. However, at the end of it, a notion of obligation is briefly proposed. Actually, this notion has some connection with our first notion of obligation. Previously, paths are always finite state sequences. Assume that infinite paths are also allowed. We say that a legal path is maximal if it is not a proper initial segment of any legal paths. A maximal legal path passes by a finite path if the finite path is an initial segment of the maximal legal path. The notion of obligation that [19] proposes is as follows: an action α is obligated at a state w iff all maximal legal paths starting at w initially pass by a path in the interpretation of α. This intuitively says that α is obligatory iff no matter how the agent will legally act, he will perform α. It can be verified that the direction from right to left holds in TDDL. However, the other direction does not hold. Let α = a * ; b. As a * ; b = 0, trivially Case α = β * . The arguments for this case are the mix of the arguments for the cases α = β ∪ γ and α = β; γ .
The respect condition for c-bisimulations is a strong requirement. Note that it cannot be replaced by the usual forth and back conditions on B: if wZw and (w, u) ∈ B, then there is a u s.t. w , u ∈ B and uZu ; if wZw and w , u ∈ B , then there is a u s.t. (w, u) ∈ B and uZu . Figure 3 provides a counter-example for this. PROPOSITION 7.5 φ is satisfiable in a pre-model iff it is satisfiable in a model. PROOF . The direction from right to left is trivial. To show the other direction, it suffices to show that for every pre-model M, there is a model M and a surjective function Z from M to M s.t. Z is a c-bisimulation respecting b. This can be done by the so-called copy method presented by [5] to handle intersection of modalities. Ju and Hu [10] provide an improvement for this method. Here we sketch the arguments where the focus is that the copy method actually has room for handling bad transitions. For missing details, we refer to [10] .
be a pre-model. In some way, we can define 2 n structures
In some way, we can merge these structures into a structure M = W , {R a | a ∈ 0 }, R 0 , R id , V where atomic actions are pairwise disjoint and the natural function Z from W to W is a c-bisimulation. Define a set B on W in the following way: (s, t) ∈ B iff (Z(s), Z(t)) ∈ B. Then B is normatively serial and Z respects b.
Connections and future work

Theoretical aspects
The process logic PL presented by [7] strictly subsumes TDDL in expressivity if we ignore the propositional constant b. Harel, Kozen and Parikh [7] show that PL is decidable and complete. However, PL has an unnatural temporal operator f , called the first-moment operator, which is not definable by other operators. TDDL is a natural merge of PDL and CTL * and we think that it is still meaningful to find a decision procedure and a complete axiomatization for it.
Another way to formalize refraining
In order to handle to do something else, we put some constraints on actions: in syntax, there are only finitely many atomic actions and there is a special action 0; in semantics, atomic actions are pairwise disjoint. These constraints let PDL express to do something else. This is an implicit way. There is a different way to handle to do something else, i.e. explicitly introducing an action constructor for it.
Actions can be defined as before except that there is a new generation rule now: α is an action if α is. To do α means to do something else than α. Models and paths are defined as before. Let T denote the set of paths. Definition 3.2 specifies an opposite function on the set of sets of computation sequences. Define it on the set of sets of paths in a similar way: for every set of paths, let = τ ∈ T | τ σ & σ τ for any σ ∈ . Actions are interpreted as sets of paths as before except that α is interpreted as S α where S α is the interpretation of α. This way of dealing with to do something else follows a similar idea with the previous way. Many results and discussions made before, especially Proposition 3.5, can be easily transplanted here. Detailed comparison of the two ways is needed.
The CTL version
CTL is a restricted version of CTL * that is widely studied and applied. In CTL, temporal operators have to be immediately preceded by path quantifiers. CTL has only state formulas and the temporal formulas of CTL * are not well formed in it. In a similar way of how CTL * and PDL are mixed in this work, we can get a natural mix of PDL and CTL. By introducing to this mixed logic a propositional constant saying that this is a bad state, we can get a deontic logic. This logic might have better computational properties than TDDL. It deserves a close look.
Betterness among actions
We in this work make a black and white distinction among transitions: bad and fine ones. It is attractive to introduce a more fine-grained betterness relation among transitions and make connections with preference-based deontic logics such as [18] .
Legal relations
Since morality has to do with our interaction with others, another important step to take is from single agent to multiple agent deontic logic. Even more realistic seems an approach where obligations are relational, and where an obligation of some agent A to do something or to refrain from doing something is always an obligation to some other agent B. A proposal for a formalization of this idea in terms of PDL is given in [20] . One of the attractions of this is that it allows us to model conflicts of duty, such as the conflicts between professional obligations and family obligations that we all know so well.
